Conceptual analytical report "Greater Eurasian Partnership: shared responsibility for a secure future"

Conceptual analytical report "Greater Eurasian Partnership: shared responsibility for a secure future."

Main content of the report

The world has entered an era of systemic transformation. Traditional geopolitical and economic models no longer ensure stability and predictability of global development processes. The level of uncertainty and tension increases.

For the states of Central Eurasia, this situation creates complex challenges and forces them to look for new optimal strategies for ensuring security and development that can withstand any type of crisis and threat. There is an urgent need to form a sustainable architecture of security and development in Eurasia.

The new architecture must be built on the basis of polycentricity, in which all participants retain opportunities for sovereign development. For the sustainability of this system, it is necessary to consolidate the general principles of the formation of the Eurasian space, reflecting the non-conflict and pragmatic nature of cooperation.

The concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) reflects the desire of the countries of the continent to join forces in the interests of peace and creation. This is a flexible system of cooperation that integrates existing various institutions of interaction into a coherent architecture. The implementation of the “integration of integrations” approach, which preserves the independence of each of the structures, will allow the formation of an integral space.

The role of Central Eurasia as the core of the BEP is determined by historical, geographical and sociocultural characteristics. This is a unique space of intersection of different cultures, ethnic groups and civilizations, transport and logistics corridors and economic interests of the largest states of the continent. Diversity is where enormous growth potential lies.

Integration processes in Central Eurasia are developing in the context of global transformation. The states of the region actively interact in various fields. Cooperation is developing in the field of trade, mutual investments, labor market, migration, water, energy and food security issues. Coordination is being increased in the fight against external challenges and threats. Socio-cultural dialogue based on mutual respect and mutual assistance is being strengthened.

The formation and development of the Eurasian Security System (EASS) should be gradual: from deepening the dialogue between existing ones (SCO, CSTO, EAEU, ASEAN, etc.) and including new organizations - to developing mechanisms of sustainability and expanding adaptation potential.

Particular attention will be paid to ensuring financial and economic security within the framework of the EASB. The scale of economic challenges, a high degree of uncertainty, external economic shocks and developing connections within the region require tools and resources to prevent and reduce financial and economic threats in order to maintain the sustainability of the system and development model. Central Eurasia's own international financial institutions, already established with a mandate to promote economic and financial stability, should become part of the model for ensuring regional security.

The emergence of Central Eurasia as a collective subject of global influence is associated with the further build-up and systematization of collective efforts to prevent challenges and threats, cooperation of opportunities, resources, technologies, etc. for more effective implementation of the national sovereignty of each country, as well as to achieve common strategic development goals.

Full assistance in discussing the idea of the Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century, initiated in 2023 by the Republic of Belarus, which received a joint vision with Russia in 2024. Responding to modern realities, the Charter has every chance of becoming the most important document in the field of security, ensuring peace in Eurasia for decades.

Ideas of solidarity development can become the basis of modern Eurasian dialogue. Its goal is to create conditions under which each country in the region can realize its potential without a threat to sovereignty and identity.

The development of the principles of solidarity development as an evolutionary response to the complexity of the modern world in the context of the crisis of imperial and neoliberal models of integration determines the need to improve existing formats, as well as the creation of new network structures - institutions of solidarity development. Such institutions could be:

- A platform for broad Eurasian dialogue, taking into account the diversity of peoples and cultures to form a common strategic vision;

- Bureau of Resources for Solidarity Development, to realize the possibility of participation of each country in solving common strategic tasks;

- The Eurasian expert and analytical community as a distributed network structure for developing responsible decisions in areas that are promising and important for Eurasia.

Introduction

The conceptual report substantiates the need to form a new security architecture in Greater Eurasia, based on the principles of solidary development. In contrast to outdated bloc models, a network system of collective security is proposed, the core of which is made up of regional structures - the CSTO, the SCO and the EAEU. A key role in this architecture is given to the Central Eurasian region (Central Eurasia - CEA) as a strategic core where the interests of major powers intersect. It is through strengthening the sustainability of the CEA that the prospect of the Greater Eurasian Partnership as a continent-wide project can be realized.

The experience of Central Eurasia in developing the principles of solidarity development is of particular importance. Thus, the CSTO practice in the field of crisis response and military-technical cooperation serves as the basis for the formation of mechanisms for ensuring military-political security within the framework of the broader Eurasian security system. The success of such a model largely depends on the transition to preventive prevention of threats and the creation of open dialogue platforms that ensure equal participation of all interested countries in the region.

The formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and a new Eurasian security system is a complex process that includes economic stability, military-political cooperation and humanitarian interaction. The contours of these projects are determined not by static equilibrium, but by the ability for permanent adaptive transformation. Their sustainability will depend on the ability of actors to generate public goods - from the North-South transport corridor to effective and flexible crisis prevention mechanisms, general scientific and technological initiatives that materialize the abstract concept of “solidarity development” into concrete projects that increase the well-being of the peoples of Eurasia and, as a result, strengthen their collective security.

The strength of the new “interaction architecture” in Eurasia is determined by its ability to adapt to changing conditions, rely on the civilizational diversity of Greater Eurasia and ensure the sovereign development of all participants.

Chapter 1. The emerging architecture of international relations, prospects for the Eurasian system of ensuring stability and security

1. Problems of the formation of a multipolar world

The ongoing global processes are significantly changing the picture of the world. The strengthening of a number of states as centers of political and economic influence creates new opportunities for promoting their interests, which entails a revision of relations between countries and blocs, opens up both favorable preconditions for building a more advanced global political system, and leads to the emergence of new contradictions and challenges. Existing mechanisms for resolving disagreements and conflicts, which previously demonstrated fairly high efficiency, today cannot cope with this function.

The need to record an objective change in the balance of power in the world came into conflict with the desire of the United States and the European Union, accustomed to their privileged position, to maintain advantages. Thus, it is the attempts of Western countries to maintain the old global order that represent the main reason for the further escalation of the international situation and the militarization of countries and associations. Building a stable world order system requires taking into account current realities and unlocking the potential of new centers of influence for the whole world.

Due to the large number of hotbeds of conflict and the tendency for them to grow, hardly anyone in Greater Eurasia would dare to say that the worsening challenges and threats of the modern world will bypass them. Frantic militarization of the European Union countries and Japan, which are preparing to increase military spending in the near future; US plans to contain China and, more broadly, to build a new political architecture in the Asia-Pacific region; the very unstable situation in the Middle East, challenges and threats emanating from the territory of Afghanistan; A smoldering conflict between nuclear powers India and Pakistan that could suddenly flare up is not a complete list of risks that governments in the region are forced to take into account.

The escalation of military conflicts in different parts of the world, the unprecedented scale of the use of sanctions mechanisms, the growth of new challenges and threats are to a large extent the consequences of ongoing confrontation, a lack of trust between the main players and dangerous voids in the international security system, which are increasingly being exploited by criminals, primarily terrorist networks.

Terrorism has actually ceased to be a weapon of marginal groups, and is increasingly establishing itself as an industry, which is based on the political and economic interests of specific countries and blocs that do not act spontaneously, but use advanced methods of analysis, planning and implementation of their plans with the aim of paralyzing the control system, or even destroying the country chosen as a victim. There is an intensification of such phenomena accompanying terrorism as illegal drug and weapons trafficking, illegal migration, organized crime, etc.

The unresolved nature of these problems creates serious challenges and threats for the countries of Central Eurasia (by which we mean the states that are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Union State), forcing them to look for optimal strategies that can ensure security and development. This is happening in a context where many of these states have, in one way or another, faced aggressive actions or attempts to interfere in their internal affairs over the recent period.

2. Expanding interaction as a way to strengthen security

The nature of decisions made in the field of international politics and security indicate that in the Central Eurasian capitals there is a deep understanding of the relevance of expanding work in collective formats and the futility of attempts to ensure security alone. One can note the growing intensification of both bilateral and multilateral ties within the framework of international structures operating in CEA. First of all, in the format of the CSTO, CIS, EAEU, and SG, serious regulatory and legal frameworks have been developed that regulate the activities of these structures in all important areas. To make collective decisions, the formats of regular meetings of heads of state, heads and experts of ministries and departments are used. The multilateral dialogue conducted within their framework makes it possible to develop collective approaches on a wide range of international issues on a planned basis.

Many years of experience in such joint work ensures the formation of the so-called “collective pole”, which makes it possible to more effectively defend interests and achieve common goals in the international arena and helps its participants pursue a truly sovereign foreign policy, through the consolidation of efforts, resources, technologies, etc. This format, increasing the opportunities for the implementation of the national sovereignty of participants, is a kind of “strategic expansion” of it in relations with third parties.

There are enough examples demonstrating that this approach finds concrete application in the activities of the CSTO. In particular, active joint military development is taking place within the Organization; collective exercises and operations of law enforcement agencies are carried out on a planned basis. Among the recent joint decisions and practical measures is the agreement on a new procedure for the CSTO’s response to crisis situations, prepared taking into account the experience of the CSTO collective peacekeeping operation in the Republic of Kazakhstan in January 2022. The new document makes it possible to minimize the time required for approval, adoption and implementation of relevant decisions.

In order to counter the entire range of challenges and threats emanating from the territory of Afghanistan, the CSTO format has approved and is implementing a Targeted Interstate Program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border, designed to ensure the security of the entire Central Asian region.

A draft Concept for the development of cooperation and integration ties of enterprises of the military-industrial complexes of the CSTO member states has been developed. The expected adoption of the Concept is aimed at promoting the development of an effective system of industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and integration of enterprises in the field of development, production, modernization, repair, operation and disposal of military, dual-use and special-purpose products.

As an example of the Organization’s adaptability to the tasks of protecting citizens from various types of challenges and threats is the creation of the Coordination Council of authorized bodies of the CSTO member states on biological safety issues, within the framework of which collective work is actively carried out aimed at ensuring sanitary and epidemiological well-being in the area of ​​responsibility.

3. Contours of future Eurasian security

At the current period, the situation with collective security in the CSTO format can be described as follows: on the one hand, collective mechanisms are used quite widely and effectively and demonstrate significant potential. On the other hand, in the context of the aggravation of old contradictions and the emergence of new ones, the military-political situation in the world is rapidly deteriorating, creating an increasingly higher burden on the collective security system created in Central Eurasia.

Given the vital importance of this issue for the countries of the region, there is an increasingly urgent need to conduct a thorough analysis of the collective security system in the context of the current situation, simulate various scenarios and prepare collective mechanisms to solve problems in new, more unfavorable conditions. It is important to ensure the establishment of a proactive approach, according to which the emphasis in defending collective interests will be on preventive rather than reactive measures.

In this vein, building up the analytical and forecasting component in the activities of the CSTO has acquired particular importance. This area of ​​work was allocated as a separate track in 2023 at the initiative of the Republic of Belarus, which included this item in the list of priorities of the chairmanship. Since then, the Secretariat of the Organization has established cooperation with leading scientific institutions and think tanks of the CSTO member states, and has organized interaction with the expert community of the CEA, SCO, and BRICS countries. The basic principles and general approaches to the self-organization of the expert community and the development of a network of think tanks in CEA were defined on the sidelines of the CSTO Ministerial Council events in June 2025. The document was called the Issyk-Kul Expert Initiative.

The results of studies conducted in this format and regular detailed exchanges of views between experts clearly demonstrate that strengthening solidarity and increasing cooperation within the CSTO are considered as a prerequisite for ensuring peace and stability in the Organization’s area of responsibility. This approach, in particular, is set out in the Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on common approaches to ensuring the security of the Eurasian space dated November 22, 2023.

Building and improving a multifunctional and effective regional security system is a very ambitious task and requires significant efforts from all stakeholders. At the same time, special responsibility falls on Russia as the largest and most influential country in Central Asia, serving as the center of gravity and the locomotive of change. Being part of integration structures with Russia's participation provides its allies with a number of unique advantages. First of all, it means partnership with a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a leading nuclear power, which also has one of the strongest ground armies in the world. Other advantages of Russia include the presence of rich reserves of natural resources and a huge territory. Of course, the business, scientific and, perhaps more important, ordinary human connections developed between the citizens of our countries are of particular value. The participation of other CEA countries in the formation and functioning of the Eurasian pole together with Russia will allow its allies to effectively promote their position on current issues both within the region and on the world stage.

It should be noted that CEA represents a crossroads of interests of almost all major global and regional players - primarily China, Turkey, the EU, and the USA, which are interested in connecting the countries of the region to the various projects they are promoting. In this context, it is important to take into account that China does not have experience in forming and participating in full-fledged associations. Türkiye, which claims special interests in Central Asia, is located far from this region and does not have the political and financial capabilities to implement large-scale integration initiatives. Moreover, it makes no sense to talk about Washington or Brussels as potential unifying centers in CEA, at least due to the fact that their interest in the CEA region is largely situational. In any case, the key requirement for the CSTO will be the continued establishment of the Organization as a reliable and highly effective platform based on deep mutual trust of the parties.

From this point of view, modern conceptual initiatives and projects designed to unlock the potential of cooperation and harmonize the course of related processes in the Eurasian space deserve special attention. Initiated in 2023 by the Republic of Belarus, the idea of ​​a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century is gaining increasing support. Responding to modern realities, the Charter has every chance of becoming for Eurasia what the Helsinki Final Act became in 1975, which provided Europe with, albeit relative, peace for decades. The idea of ​​the Charter is consistent with the foreign policy and economic initiative “Greater Eurasian Partnership” (BEP) put forward by Russia in 2015, aimed at building a space of security and development in Eurasia.

In the context of the issues raised, it is impossible not to mention that the current OSCE crisis began when this organization began to focus not on relations between countries, but on the state of affairs within countries. This is another confirmation that the basis of any modern security system should be an understanding of the fact that there is no single recipe for building a successful society, and only a conscious, not externally imposed transformation of countries and societies can contribute to the rooting of new views and approaches.

4. On practical approaches to ensuring future Eurasian security

Methodologically, the issue of further strengthening the collective security system should be worked out along two tracks: from the point of view of achieving short-term goals, continue the course towards the development and rapprochement of existing formats: CSTO, CIS, EAEU, SG and SCO. In terms of implementing medium- and long-term goals, based on the prospects for the development of the situation, it would be necessary to simultaneously begin to study the possibility of forming new interstate structures, in fact, institutions of solidarity development with broader powers. Such institutions could harmonize the integration space in CEA, ensuring the implementation of the principle of co-development. At the same time, the most appropriate principle when building relationships on all contours seems to be the slogan “Security through cooperation!”, implying the achievement of such a degree of interconnectedness and interaction between countries that any violation of these ties will be considered by all parties as extremely undesirable.

The main tasks of the CSTO in Central Eurasia: Comprehensive development of existing regional mechanisms, increasing interaction between associations on the entire list of pressing problems, exploring the issue of creating institutions of solidarity development that can become multinational centers regulating various areas of joint work.

It is also important to take into account the position of the countries in the region, which are not ready to take on full obligations to participate in the CSTO, but are nevertheless interested in one form or another of participation in strengthening security in CEA. Promote partnership and observation institutions. In the event of joint military operations, provide for the possibility of third countries participating in them on a coalition basis.

Despite all attempts to cause discord in Russia’s relations with its neighbors, diverse ties in the CEA region remain strong, which is reflected in the progressive development of political dialogue and the expansion of economic interaction. Sociological surveys also convincingly show a positive attitude towards Russia in Belarus and the countries of Central Asia. On the other hand, this area is not free from opportunistic sentiments, which is expressed, in particular, in the position of the countries of the South Caucasus on a number of important regional political issues. However, against this background, both political and economic relations show significant progress. There is every reason to assert that in Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi there is an understanding that the Eurasian factor will remain highly relevant in any of the possible scenarios, and Russia will remain the most important component of the military-political situation in the region.

The main tasks of the CSTO in Greater Eurasia: Greater Eurasia is a colossal space in which countries are located that differ in territory, political, economic and sociocultural structure, in some cases having not only regional, but also serious global ambitions. On the one hand, significant untapped potential in terms of politics and security is obvious. On the other hand, the continent does not have its own coordinating system and structure for ensuring peace and stability. Against this background, there is reason to believe that in many countries in the region there is already or is a growing understanding of the importance of creating a common space of security and sustainable development.

Promising formats that expand the space of dialogue and trust in the field of security in Eurasia are: the International Conference on Eurasian Security in Minsk, organized from 2023 and gaining increasing authority, as well as established in 2025. International conference on cybersecurity in Cholpon-Ata (Kyrgyzstan).

The main tasks of the CSTO at the global level: continuing cooperation with the UN on existing tracks (peacekeeping, countering terrorism and drug trafficking), to pursue an agreed line on the reform of the Organization. Create and expand political coalitions at the UN. The CSTO member states are deeply interested in the existence of a strong and reliable global institution capable of formulating new global rules of living that are acceptable to the world and, most importantly, ensuring their compliance.

Obviously, the urgent task for the near future is to recognize the leading role of Eurasia in the formation of the global security system.

The Eurasian Security System (EASS) is a complex phenomenon that embraces a variety of institutions, a wide range of actors, principles and norms, new political and diplomatic practices, including informal ones, initiatives, and ideological meanings. This is a kind of conglomerate of institutions, initiatives and projects in the field of security. Today, there is a whole set of trends accompanying the formation of the EASB, including a unifying agenda, peace as normality, constructive dialogue, synergy of potentials, etc. In basic terms, the parameters of the future system are reflected by the above-mentioned draft Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century.

To solve such an ambitious task, a number of systemic actions will be required aimed at conceptualizing the category of “security space”, creating our own optics for defining the “Eurasian vision” of security, etc. The factors that determined the development of the new security system have very great potential. For example, the conceptual convergence of the multipolar world model promoted by Russia and Belarus with the Chinese model of a “community with a common destiny for mankind” (proposed by the Chinese leadership in 2012) forms the contours of a new mechanism for determining the global agenda and, most importantly, global governance.

One of the key problems is determining the place of the Eurasian security system in the global security system, the parameters of which are determined by documents and institutions of the United Nations. The main strategic planning documents of the Russian Federation indicate that Russian foreign policy, in particular, solves the problem of restoring the role of the UN as a central coordinating mechanism in coordinating the interests of UN member states and their actions to achieve the goals of the UN Charter. The Republic of Belarus follows a similar approach; its policy is aimed at creating working mechanisms for ensuring global security. These include eliminating the practice of imposing sanctions without a decision of the UN Security Council, along with the creation of a mechanism of international legal guarantees that would not allow the use of such a method of pressure; development of a new legal mechanism to create a transparent control regime over new deadly technologies; adoption of an international legal act on cyber non-aggression. In this regard, China, India and other countries of the macroregion generally agree with Russia and Belarus. Thus, one can be convinced that the ideologists of the EASB, represented by Russia and Belarus, clearly indicate its place in the global security system. It is assumed that this will be one of its elements at the macro-regional level. However, taking into account the scale of the new system, the composition of its participants, the accumulated experience of its supporting structures represented by the CSTO, SCO, EAEU, ASEAN, CIS and others, as well as its principles and ideological foundations, it can be assumed that this element will be able to have a significant impact on the global security system and this will be a great achievement on the path to solidary development.

Today, the dominant point of view in expert discussions is that the formation of a unified and monolithic Eurasian security system is unlikely. Instead, a network model of the Eurasian security system will develop, based on the diversity of existing integration projects and institutions as stabilizing platforms for Eurasia. This will be partly due to extremely fierce competition between different world order models. The point is that the Eurasian security system will be a conglomerate of institutions, initiatives and projects.

It is obvious that the process of forming a Eurasian security system will be gradual. It is likely that it will begin with a dialogue between existing organizations (SCO, CSTO, EAEU, ASEAN, etc.), expanding to include other countries and multi-format interstate associations.

The first stage has essentially already begun - active coordination of positions and coordination of policies of international organizations is underway. Thus, back in 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the secretariats of the SCO and ASEAN. The possibility of establishing mutually beneficial cooperation between the EAEU, ASEAN and the SCO was supported by the ASEAN member states at the Russia-ASEAN summit in 2016 (Sochi). At the Russia-ASEAN summit in Singapore in 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding was concluded between the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) and ASEAN. The cooperation program between the EAEU and ASEAN has been extended until 2025. In 2020, the SCO Council of Heads of State decided to sign a Memorandum of Understanding between the SCO Secretariat and the EEC (signed in Dushanbe in 2021). In September 2025, in Beijing, on the sidelines of the SCO summit, the thirteenth meeting of the Highest Administrative Officials of the CSTO, the CIS and the SCO was held, during which a Roadmap for the development of cooperation between the three organizations was adopted.

At the second stage, it will be necessary to determine coordination mechanisms when developing solutions for managing the entire Eurasian security system, as well as the areas of responsibility of each of the structures that act as pillars of the EASC. Security is not limited to military and military-political aspects; it includes economic cooperation, the fight against poverty and inequality, as well as joint counteraction to challenges such as terrorism, extremism, cybercrime, etc. At first glance, the “distribution of responsibilities” seems obvious: the CSTO and individual segments are responsible for military-political security - the SCO, for economic security - the EAEU, SCO, ASEAN, etc. However, in practice everything turns out to be much more complicated. Thus, the decisions of the Tianjin SCO summit showed that the latter is in no hurry to use the infrastructure and experience of the CSTO in terms of countering challenges and threats, but is forming its own regional structures. Thus, key participants will have to make significant efforts to most effectively connect existing structures, their national projects and potentials. It seems that one of the points of connection could be joint work on introducing into the field of strategic planning documents of international organizations such concepts as “information invasion”, “resource blockade”, “pre-hybrid actions”, etc., characterizing modern hybrid confrontation.

Finally, at the third stage, the system will solve the problem of maintaining sustainability and expanding adaptive potential. The list of tasks will be formed based on the results of the first two stages. Obviously, as already indicated above, the Eurasian security system will not represent a rigid structure characteristic of block-type systems. It will rather be an open polystructural dynamic system - a conglomerate of international structures, states and non-state players, between which there are flexible, often non-linear connections. The outer contours of the system will be characterized as “soft edges”. We are talking about the denial and absence of rigid structures within the system, as well as its ability to absorb other structures of various natures (without the need to overcome any systemic barriers), to actively implement informal practices. Such parameters of the new system fully reflect the request for a format that represents a circle of like-minded people who pursue similar goals, but do not form special institutional settings and adhere to legally non-binding principles and norms of political behavior in the international arena, appealing to political responsibility.

Reliance on soft structures automatically increases the level of adaptability of the system to changing international conditions. It is obvious that the Eurasian project will sooner or later have to compete with the Euro-Atlantic project, which, despite the split in the ranks of the collective West provoked by Trump’s European policy, is still demonstrating stability. To preserve the subjectivity of the new system, it is necessary to consolidate the strategic universal values ​​of the Eurasian space, which would become the basis for a non-conflict and pragmatic dialogue between East and West, South and North.

The stakes are extremely high due to the fact that many countries have colossal military capabilities, including nuclear potential, and any clash, even one that begins as a local conflict, can lead to a fatal outcome for the world.

The strongest motivation for the CSTO member states is to avoid confrontation, contribute to the evolutionary transition of the world order to a new state and take a worthy place in it, allowing one to effectively promote the interests of collective security.

A global dialogue is needed, and this issue must become an integral part of the international agenda, despite the position of forces that retain the hope that they will be able to defend the opposite position through methods of pressure and blackmail. It is in the interests of the CEA countries to promote this idea, to be the initiators of new agreements that will keep humanity from sliding into the abyss of new wars, and will create conditions for sustainable peace and development.

Chapter 2. Prospects for the development of the Eurasian economy in the context of global transformations

The global fragmentation of the world economy, caused by the escalation of trade and sanctions conflicts, is forming new regional contours. In this fragmentation, Central Eurasia becomes a key link, a region with significant potential, space for the development of internal sources of growth in the interests of citizens.

The successful adaptation of the states of Central Eurasia to new challenges and the realization of their long-term growth potential directly depend on the presence of common approaches to the development of the region shared by all states of the region. To maximize the results from the use of such common approaches, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for mutually beneficial partnerships, as well as ensure stability and predictability of the interaction environment, including in the economic sphere.

According to information from the Sovereign Financing Database of the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, in the Eurasian region, dozens of international development institutions annually provide states with approximately $10 billion in funding for regional projects and development initiatives.

Future generations will pay for the strategic decisions of their ancestors and the loans taken from international donors for these ambitious initiatives, projects and programs.

It is extremely important, firstly, to be sure whether the above projects and initiatives will bring real benefits to the states and the region as a whole, and will not become a burden of public debt. Secondly, to ensure economic stability for the implementation of such projects and initiatives.

The sustainability of future economic growth, the success of the implementation of initiatives and cooperation directly depends on the ability of states, based on an objective assessment of their decisions, to ensure economic security as the basis for this work.

Given the high degree of economic uncertainty and risks for Central Eurasia, it is necessary to think about a regional international institution for promoting economic stability and development, which will become a trusted assistant in preparing a comprehensive and objective analysis for making strategic decisions aimed at ensuring strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the region.

1. Analysis of economic trends in Central Eurasia

The period of the last five years has become a time of serious testing and active adaptation to a series of powerful external shocks for the economies of Central Eurasia. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the onset of the CBO in 2022, and subsequent unprecedented changes in US trade policy in 2025 required a rapid adjustment to new realities.

Despite a number of shocks that have occurred over the past few years, most economies in the region have demonstrated resilience and maintained positive dynamics in economic activity (Figure 1). Thus, in 2022-2025, the average annual GDP growth rates of most economies of Central Eurasia remained at a fairly high level. The growth rates of the economies of the CSTO member states (with the exception of Russia) during this period averaged 6.8% per year, which significantly exceeds pre-Covid values ​​(3.6% in 2016-2019). It is noteworthy that, despite sanctions pressure, the average annual growth rate of the Russian economy since the beginning of the CBO has remained close to the potential level (about 2%).

Under the current conditions, several key sources of economic growth in the region can be identified:

Resource export. For resource-based economies such as Russia and Kazakhstan, the main driver remains income from exports of energy, metals and food, reoriented to Asian markets. Increasing supplies of oil, coal and liquefied natural gas to China, India and other countries compensated for the loss of European markets.

Transfers and logistics. For less resource-rich countries, a significant growth factor was the influx of remittances from labor migrants (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), as well as active re-export and transit activities (Kyrgyzstan and Armenia), associated with the restructuring of global supply chains.

Domestic demand. An important driver in many countries in the region has been domestic demand, which is supported by stimulating domestic lending and increasing government spending. However, soft fiscal policy led to government budget deficits. To finance it, the authorities are actively resorting to borrowing, which creates risks for debt sustainability in the medium term.

Inflationary pressure has become one of the key challenges for most countries in the region. Global increases in food and energy prices, exacerbated by currency devaluations and supply chain disruptions, have led to a sharp acceleration in inflation since 2020. This trend was especially pronounced in 2022-2025, when the average inflation rate in the CSTO region was 7.5%, and in Russia - 9.3%. At the same time, China and, to a lesser extent, India showed persistently low rates (0.5% and 4.8%, respectively, in 2022-2025).

The response to the acceleration of inflation was the consistent tightening of monetary policy by central banks. In 2022-2025, key rates in the economies of the CSTO member states (10.3%) and separately in Russia (16.1%) were significantly increased to curb inflation processes and stabilize national currencies.

The strengthening of the role of the state has become another noticeable trend. In conditions of high uncertainty and limited access to international capital markets, governments in the region have increased their role in the economy to maintain stability. Although this measure was forced in the short term, it requires careful assessment from the point of view of the long-term competitiveness of economies, the development of private initiative and market flexibility

In trade, in response to the geopolitical challenges of recent years, there has been a fundamental, structural shift from the Europe/US direction to the East Asian vector. It is expressed in two key trends: increased economic integration with Russia and the growing role of China. Data for 2022-2024 demonstrate a significant increase in Russia’s share in the foreign trade turnover of a number of countries: in Belarus - up to 67% (an increase of 16 percentage points compared to the period 2016-2019), in Armenia - up to 38% (+11 percentage points). In parallel with this, China’s share is growing rapidly, especially in Russia (30%, +14 p.p.), Kazakhstan (21%, +8 p.p.) and Kyrgyzstan (35%, +7 p.p.).

This shift in trade is spurring the active development of new logistics routes and the increasing importance of land routes through Central Asia. The declining share of the “rest of the world” in trade of Belarus (from 43% to 24%), Russia (from 85% to 70%) and other countries in the region creates significant opportunities for investment in the development of transport, warehouse and port infrastructure necessary to service redirected trade flows.

Forecasts for the period 2026-2028 show mixed but generally positive dynamics in the region. Economic growth rates are expected to vary significantly, from moderate 1.0-1.7% in Russia and Belarus to high 4.2-7.1% in Central Asia. The growth leaders will be Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, whose economies are projected to grow at an average rate of over 5% per year. At the same time, Kazakhstan and Armenia will maintain stable GDP growth rates of about 4.5-5.0%. It is important to note that the projected indicators for all countries of the region, with the exception of Russia and Belarus, confidently exceed the world average (2.4-2.7%).

This growth, in the context of global transformation, fragmentation, regionalization, as well as the intention of countries to develop regional cooperation, will be accompanied by a further increase in the interconnectedness of the economies of the Eurasian region, the selection of effective infrastructure solutions and adaptation to new logistics and trade conditions.

At the same time, the level of uncertainty regarding the further dynamics of trade conflicts remains high. The risk of escalating confrontation between some of the world's largest economies could spread trade tensions to entire regions, having a negative impact on global demand and commodity market conditions.

2. Integration processes in Central Eurasia

2.1. Objective prerequisites

The states of Central Eurasia are interconnected and cooperate in many areas. According to EFSD estimates, in the economic sphere these are trade and mutual investments, the formation of common commodity and production chains, migration flows affecting labor markets and the financial services sector, as well as cooperation in the water and energy sector and to ensure food security. In the political sphere, states interact through bilateral and multilateral formats, coordinating foreign policy positions. In security matters, coordination is carried out to combat cross-border crime, terrorism and border cooperation. Interaction in the fields of science, education and culture contributes to the improvement of human capital and technology transfer.

The processes of economic integration in Central Eurasia have a solid objective basis, which has intensified in the context of global transformation. This is explained as follows:

Firstly, in the Eurasian region there is a plurality of economic centers (Russia, Kazakhstan, China, India, etc.), which, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, create a network of partnerships to maximize the economic potential of their states based on geo-economic complementarity.

Economies with significant resources (energy, fertilizers, food, certain technologies, military-industrial complex) are in high demand in fast-growing Asian markets. In turn, Asian countries, primarily China, India, and Vietnam, are a source of large-scale investments, finished consumer goods, as well as advanced technological solutions (in the field of telecommunications, electronics, green energy) necessary for the diversification and modernization of other economies of the Eurasian region. This complementarity creates a strong foundation for trade and cooperation.

Secondly, the countries of the region are closely interconnected in various formats, initiatives and projects. The presence of a number of integration associations and initiatives (Greater Eurasian Partnership - BEP, BRICS, EAEU, Belt and Road, CSTO, SCO, CAREC, etc.) plays a key role in the formation of a new architecture of cooperation and development in the Eurasian space. They go beyond purely political dialogue and propose specific projects in the fields of economics, security and infrastructure.

Thirdly, the Eurasian region is characterized by close continental connectivity:

Geographic - countries are united by common borders.

Infrastructure – the presence of joint infrastructure projects, including cross-border ones (for example, energy networks, railway infrastructure, etc.).

Economic – creation of free trade zones, elimination of non-tariff barriers, harmonization of legislation, industrial cooperation.

Digital – creating common digital platforms, ensuring uninterrupted data flow, cooperation in the IT field.

Logistics – the development of cross-border transport corridors creates a material basis for deepening economic cooperation (for example, the North-South ITC, the China-Western Europe ITC, the Northern Sea Route, etc.).

Fourthly, the states of Central Eurasia are participants in various international institutions that are actively working in the field of supporting sustainable development (EFSD, EBRD, NDB AIIB, ADB, bilateral agencies, development funds and others).

In the context of global fragmentation, the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) seems to be the most complete and relevant concept of Eurasian integration. The core of the BEP could be the states of Central Eurasia and the multilateral formats and initiatives operating in this space, primarily such as the EAEU and the CSTO. The BEP states are united geographically, they represent countries with developing and transition economies with high development potential; large logistics corridors pass through the region.

2.2. Opportunities and risks

Integration channels create ample opportunities for mutually beneficial partnerships for the development of each economy and the region as a whole. However, these channels can become conductors of crisis phenomena. Problems in one particular country can have significant negative effects on other economies and the region as a whole. In this regard, high-quality monitoring of threats to economic and financial stability is required both in individual countries and in the region as a whole.

Deepening integration and participation of countries in various Eurasian projects, on the one hand, opens up significant opportunities for strengthening the economies of the region, but on the other hand, it is associated with serious risks.

The development of integration opens up the following prospects:

• Economic growth and development: joint investment projects contribute to the diversification of economies and the creation of new jobs.

• Increased efficiency and reduced costs: the removal of administrative barriers, harmonization of standards and optimization of logistics directly reduce the cost and time of delivery of goods, increasing competitiveness.

• Increasing sovereignty and stability: deepening cooperation resolves issues of energy, food and financial security, reducing dependence on the actions of Western counterparties and the volatility of the dollar system.

• Technological exchange and innovation: participation in joint projects in the field of high technology and green energy allows for the transfer of knowledge, allowing for the modernization of various areas of activity.

However, its implementation is associated with the following potential threats:

• Economic risks: high interdependence without proper collective risk management mechanisms can lead to the rapid spread of economic shocks; there is a risk of uneven distribution of benefits and concentration of wealth among large players; potential debt dependence on investments with low returns; the risk of financing “projects of the century” with dubious economic returns, which will become a burden on the economy in the long term.

• Geopolitical and regulatory risks: competition between countries in the region for sales markets and investments; disagreements on political and economic issues; persisting bureaucratic barriers and corrupt practices.

• Technological risks: Increased digital connectivity increases vulnerability to cyber attacks, risks of data leaks and technological espionage.

• Internal and social risks: intensive infrastructure development can exacerbate environmental problems; economic benefits may be distributed unevenly, exacerbating social divisions.

• Thus, the success of mutually beneficial integration will depend on the ability of the participants to maximize the positive potential of cooperation while effectively managing the complex of emerging risks both at the state level and in multilateral formats. Often, risk assessment requires cross-country analysis using advanced global and regional expertise.

3. Financial institutions and mechanisms for maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability in Central Eurasia

3.1. Brief overview of key institutions

One of the mechanisms actively used in the region for maximizing the positive potential of cooperation while effectively managing a complex of emerging risks are international development institutions.

A wide range of international financial institutions are represented in the Eurasian region. Among them are the “oldest” institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the “new” Western ones (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD), the “new” East Asian players (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB), and finally, the institutions of the region created by the states of the region for the region (EFSD). In addition, numerous development agencies, institutions of the Arab Coordination Group (ACG) play a significant role

At the same time, each institute is focused on specific areas, topics and sectors of support, and has an “ideology” at the heart of its activities, formulated by the participating states. This “ideology” is promoted through development projects and programs through conditionality, preferential treatment, and the offer of certain technologies and standards. This “ideology” is formulated in policies, institutional approaches, and institutional practices.

The main activities of international development financial institutions include: supporting budgets and balances of payments during periods of economic shocks and to facilitate the implementation of policies necessary to ensure sustainable and balanced growth, supporting the development of key infrastructure within and between states, providing technical assistance to strengthen the institutional capacity of states.

While there are many international financial institutions operating in the region, only a few institutions have an explicit mandate to help ensure the macrostability of the Eurasian economy. Among them, for example, the International Monetary Fund, headquartered in Washington, USA, the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD), headquartered in Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan.

A similar structure is typical for other regions of the world and is proving its effectiveness. For example, institutions specialized in macroeconomic stability and security in the Middle East are the Arab Monetary Fund, in South America the Latin American Reserve Fund, in Europe the European Stability Mechanism, and in Southeast Asia the Chiang Mai Multilateral Initiative. All of them are united by the concept of the “Global Financial Safety Net” and work in coordination with the IMF, but according to their own agenda, which puts the strategic interests of the region at the forefront.

Other organizations also have related functionality to promote economic stability, but it is aimed at supporting their other, main mandate. These include multilateral development banks including ADB, AIIB, Islamic Development Bank, New Development Bank (BRICS), bilateral development partners including the European Commission, and bilateral development agencies. Meanwhile, these institutions use budget support to complement their instruments in the field of financing basic infrastructure and other areas of development assistance.

3.2. Analysis of financial support for Central Eurasian countries

According to information from the EFSD Sovereign Finance Database, in the region, international financial institutions finance programs and projects on average of about US$8 billion annually. Thus, the total volume of approved financing in 2024 became a record since the beginning of maintaining the database, also exceeding the volumes of the global crisis of 2009 and the covid crisis of 2020.

In the institutional structure, in terms of the volume of approved financing since 2008, the Asian Development Bank has been leading, followed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, the share of Arab financial institutions (the so-called Arab Coordination Group) together accounted for even more funds than was approved by the IMF.

Financing of investment projects accounts for the largest volume of approved financing. It is used in sectors such as infrastructure, human development, agriculture, health, energy, public administration and administration, and is typically provided for medium- to long-term projects (5-10 year period). In terms of sectors, financing of transport, energy, water supply and sanitation, and agriculture prevails.

Technical assistance (TA) is the smallest group in terms of financial allocations, but the largest in terms of number of operations and the most important component of support. This is due to the fact that TC operations are aimed at systemic processes - the development of institutions, training, creation and strengthening of capacity for the implementation of projects of the beneficiary country through the transfer of expertise. Such expertise and training are transferred along with standards and policies, often reflecting the “ideology” of the donor, which can influence the direction of government policies.

As part of stabilization financing, funds are mainly used to improve economic policy and improve public administration. Over the past few years, a total of $2.7 billion in stabilization funding has been approved for Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Among the main international institutions that approved this amount are the World Bank, ADB, AIIB, EFSD and IMF.

4. Ensuring sustainable growth: the need to create a key regional financial mechanism in Central Eurasia

4.1. Arguments for a key regional financial mechanism

The scale of the challenges, a high degree of uncertainty, external economic shocks and the inevitable strengthening of economic ties both within the region and with the largest economies of Central Eurasia require a mechanism (institution) that can provide effective support in ensuring economic security as one of the elements of the security system in the region.

Such a mechanism should be built on the principles of solidary development shared by the entire region, taking into account and disseminating the best regional and global expertise, providing the ability to manage risks to economic stability and providing an objective assessment of regional initiatives and projects.

Also, to strengthen the security of the region, it is necessary to ensure high autonomy of funding from external donors, placing maximum emphasis on the interests of the region, a deep understanding of the specifics of regional development and mobilization of the region’s internal resources for joint support of partners.

Thus, there is an objective need to consolidate efforts to create a more powerful and multifunctional key regional financial institution for Central Eurasia. The main arguments in its favor are as follows:

• Independent and objective assessment of risks to the economic stability (security) of the region.

Conducting continuous monitoring (diagnosis) of macroeconomic conditions in the region, as well as risks to macro-financial stability that may be shaped by various bilateral and multilateral initiatives or integration projects, as well as policy measures. The implementation of such a function will allow us to institutionalize our own expert assessment of the situation, independent of external influence, and will create a reliable analytical basis for assisting in decision-making at the national and regional levels, where necessary.

• Preventive stabilization financing.

In contrast to models aimed at combating emerging crises, the institute could, based on the conclusions obtained within the framework of macroeconomic diagnostics, support macroeconomic stabilization programs for the preventive management of potential risks. This would allow countries to save public resources, which otherwise could be spent on servicing public debt for the provided stabilization financing, strengthen macroeconomic stability before the onset of shocks, reducing the cost of borrowing and building financial reserves, which is especially important in conditions of global uncertainty.

• Assistance in realizing the needs of states for structural changes.

There is a need for specialized tools to promote deep structural transformations that will strengthen economic security in the medium term: economic diversification, human capital development, digital transformation, adaptation to climate risks and others.

• Increasing the financial and economic security of the region.

The institution would become a central element of protection against crises and the impact of volatility in international markets. It would strengthen “immunity” against speculative attacks and serve as a reliable source of stable financing, including in national currencies, reducing dependence on Western institutions and global capital markets.

4.2. Outline proposals for the mechanism

The proposed institution should be focused on ensuring economic stability, based on advanced governance principles to ensure its legitimacy, effectiveness and long-term sustainability. Its development is possible both on the basis of existing institutions (by expanding coverage and providing sufficient resources) and in the format of a new structure. In doing so, it is advisable to consider using existing architecture to ensure synergies, avoid duplication of functions and coordinate efforts with existing institutions.

Key principles for the organization of the proposed institute include:

• A common “ideology of development” as the foundation of activity: it should become not only a financial, but also an ideological unifier, embodying the region’s common vision of a sustainable and fair economy. This conceptual framework should include, as a minimum:

• Sovereignty and non-interference: priority of national development models; the conditions for providing funding should be technical, not political.

• Common interests and principles: focus on projects that bring positive effects to the entire region.

• Pragmatism and effectiveness: focus on objective diagnosis and evaluation of effectiveness.

Architecture must be based on collective management. The core of the institute should be made up of states that are ready to take leadership in the development of the institute and act as guarantors of stability in the region. Their leading role in capital and management will provide the mechanism with the necessary scale and political weight. At the same time, taking into account the interests of “small economies” will serve as a tool for consolidating the entire region around common goals, preventing fragmentation.

The functionality of the institute should include:

• Conducting regular assessments of economic security risks through macroeconomic and sectoral diagnostics of participating countries.

• Analysis of opportunities and risks of cross-border initiatives and their impact on the region.

• Providing stabilization and investment financing.

• Assisting in the development of long-term growth potential of economies through assistance in the development of governance institutions within the state.

• Promoting the use of national currencies in payments and lending to de-dollarize the regional economy.

• Creation of a practical platform for confidential dialogue on issues of regional economic development and for dialogue between experts.

Chapter 3. Humanitarian dimension of strategic partnership – socio-cultural development of Eurasia as a multidimensional process of ensuring strategic partnership

1. The need for a humanitarian component in designing the future

The current stage of socio-economic development calls for a special role of design. The spontaneous play of market forces, as well as rigid command and administrative planning, are currently losing out to design as a form of determining the future. The problem that faces all multilateral international projects of our time is to determine the most effective forms of designing the future. It seems that this complex process should include a humanitarian, socio-cultural component as a reflection of those interests and needs of society that cannot be reduced to satisfying economic needs, and the implementation of which can either support or cancel economic achievements. To lay a solid foundation for future development, it is necessary to move the dialogue beyond purely economic and technological issues: a broader agenda of dialogue is needed, since only in this way can new possibilities for the future become clear. Only this approach makes it possible to meaningfully connect the practical tools of strategic partnership with its strategic goals and prospects, revealing its essence as a guarantee of a worthy future in the new world order.

The prospects for strategic partnership on the Eurasian continent, as they are designated in existing projects, can be considered in different dimensions and on different scales: firstly, these are the prospects of international regional associations based on strategic partnerships, such as the CSTO, SCO, CIS, and secondly, these are the prospects of the continental project - the Greater Eurasian Partnership, “integration of integrations”. It is obvious that strategic partnership projects that already actually exist, and a project covering the entire continent that is only entering the design stage, can form a different architecture of interaction - from a rigid hierarchy to a flexible network structure.

2. Two approaches to strategic partnerships: exclusivity versus integration

Regional strategic partnership projects can position themselves - for internal and external audiences - as associations of an exclusive, exceptional nature, opposing other partnership projects and the very possibility of putting forward other partnership projects. The ideas of the EU elites about the “garden” and the “jungle”, where the “garden” is “their” association, and the “jungle” is the rest of the world, figuratively characterizes this approach, a reflection and refraction of ideas about the realities of a unipolar world, the desire to preserve, recreate, and build such realities in a new way.

Another design option is focused on the possibility of building mutually beneficial relations between strategic partnership associations both with other existing or potential associations, and with sovereign states not included in the associations. Accordingly, here, multi-speed and multi-format integration or the choice in favor of a different form of cooperation and interaction is seen not as a defect and not as a phenomenon acceptable at the stage of preparation for joining the association, but as a practical reflection of the recognition of the value of sovereignty in the world of the 21st century.

It seems that the line between these design options lies not in the economic or political spheres, but primarily in the humanitarian sphere - in the field of ideas about interaction with others, including other civilizations. The “garden vs. jungle” scheme embodies the legacy of colonial times of interaction between Western Europe and other regions of the world, including other regions of Eurasia. The scheme of “integration of integrations” presupposes the possibility of different bases for strategic partnership - bases that are not reducible to economic gain or the realization of political ambitions, presupposes the recognition of the right of association for all sovereign states. However, “integration of integrations” will not be able to include participants who insist on their exclusivity, on their right to satisfy their own interests, incl. security interests, at the expense of others, based on the “garden vs. jungle” doctrine. However, they themselves do not see themselves in such a partnership model.

3. Cultural and civilizational foundations of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

The vision of the prospects for the Greater Eurasian Partnership largely depends on the point of view. From the starting point, the one from which the idea of ​​the Greater Eurasian Partnership was proclaimed, this is, first of all, a territory of peace. Peace as a humanitarian value, as a set of relations that ensures the reality of a single and indivisible security, understood simultaneously as the main goal and as a necessary condition for deepening economic cooperation.

Currently, economic interaction in the Greater Eurasia space in a number of cases occurs between countries that are in unfriendly relations with each other - directly or through intermediaries - but nevertheless occurs. The paradox is that the intensification of economic interaction in this regard does not lead – at least on one of the sides, the Western one – to a search for common ground, to a search for a common language, to a mood for dialogue. However, such interaction and its activation forms barriers against the expansion of uncontrolled interactions of a conflict-confrontational nature, and becomes a potential starting point for a new dialogue on issues of security and cooperation, interconnected values ​​of security and cooperation.

On the one hand, the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, in one of its interpretations, can be considered as an idea of returning to the ideas of mutually beneficial international cooperation of the 1990s – early 2000s. On the other hand, this idea can be seen as fundamental for a certain new set of relationships, the dream of which was present before, but which does not have more or less close historical analogies. Indeed, the second approach is more focused on the future, but it lacks material support in the present, in today's conflict-ridden Eurasia.

The current US administration’s bet on changing the style of relations in one of the regions of Eurasia - the Middle East - immediately (and, presumably, this will not change in the near future) encountered manifestations of the influence of regional players, whose subjectively understood interests, both under the influence of recent historical realities and under the influence of public sentiment, interpreted selectively, suggest the continuation of the conflict, rather than building a framework for the upcoming settlement.

This example indicates the possibility (and at the same time difficulty of implementation) of a scenario when proposals to resolve existing disagreements, and not in the format of traditional mediation, come from the outside, or are sought in the practice of others. This example, more importantly, indicates the demand for searching for existing solutions in the experience of other states, interstate formats, and associations of states based on a jointly accumulated heritage.

In the early 2000s, one of the scenarios for the development of Eurasia was theoretically seen as interaction between the west and east of the continent, to the dynamics and vectors of which all other participants were asked to adapt. In the same 2000s, experience showed the unviability of a scenario that does not take into account the interests and is not based on the interests of other entities, other sovereign states. One of the key defects of the scheme, of course, was the exclusion of Central Eurasia from it. Instead of a realistic project of discussion (but precisely a project of discussion, in no case a project of a scheme), an ideological, colonially oriented construction was proposed. One of the problems is that this design is still rooted in the minds of Western European elites - they are ready to bargain on the issue of who will be the second, subordinate participant, but they proceed from the fact that the first and leading participant in the scheme will be the system under their control.

Thus, the first and, perhaps, key condition for the formation of approaches to building a future united Eurasia, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, is the rejection of the colonial, selfish policy of the West of the Eurasian continent, which reproduces constructs of destruction or forceful subjugation of others, others not included in the system. This policy, objectively, is categorically alien to the very civilizational space of Eurasia - the space of many civilizations that have withstood attempts to destroy them (in most cases, from the West).

4. Central Eurasia as an emerging model of polycentricity

It is necessary to search for historical analogies and build a modern model of interstate and interethnic relations in the large Eurasian space, based not on inciting hatred, but on the search for agreement. Civilizational diversity is what Greater Eurasia inherited historically, and what Greater Eurasia must preserve in the context of a new stage of technological development.

The civilizational diversity of the Eurasian continent is an obstacle from the point of view of the liberal development model, and an advantage from the point of view of a model that goes beyond the limitations set by the Washington Consensus of the 1990s. What was seen as an obstacle within the previously dominant schemes is an advantage, and the bearers of the characteristics of these advantages must be sought outside the participants in the previously dominant schemes.

The experience of the states of Central Eurasia, which managed to ensure complementary interaction between ethnic groups and religions, takes on special significance in this situation. Whether historically by chance or not, these relations turned out to be localized precisely in the center of the Eurasian continent.

The experience of Central Eurasia demonstrates that different economic structures and different historical experiences are not an obstacle to mutually beneficial interaction that guarantees the rights of peoples, including the right to self-determination. The idea from the West that in order to gain equal rights with others it is necessary to reach a certain level of development is refuted by the historical experience of Central Eurasia. In this regard, relations similar to those formed historically in Central Eurasia may turn out to be a model for other regions of the continent, and for regions outside the continent.

In this case, the values of solidarity are not fiscalized and are not transformed into the tasks of forcing unification. Historical diversity becomes not an obstacle, but a driving force of socio-economic development. The increasing diversity of the international environment is transforming it into a space of sovereign choice, where states and alliances can occupy positions of either centers of power or mediators, making a dynamic choice between open and closed forms of regionalization.

At the moment, uniformity and unification does not look like a possible goal, but, first of all, as an obstacle to sustainable and mutually beneficial international relations - both bilateral and multilateral. The future model of interaction between the sovereign states of Eurasia looks like protecting diversity, sovereignty, and national identity in the first place. The historical experience of Russia as a state committed to understanding the views and approaches of representatives of different ethnic groups and religions in the implementation of this model is, of course, of particular importance.

The Greater Eurasian Partnership as a unification of space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean, is today becoming a model of the future, oriented towards practical implementation.

Regardless of the extent to which potential participants share the idea of Eurasia as a single space, it seems useful (and at the same time, it seems to be a criterion for taking the task seriously) to search for models of dialogue between existing socio-political structures, focused on socio-political dialogue on the scale of Eurasia in the future.

The parliamentary structures of the states of the Eurasian continent are seen as potential participants in such a dialogue. The socio-political diversity of Eurasian states, reflected in the composition of national parliaments, objectively needs representation at the international level, not limited by existing formats. A promising step could be the creation of the Chamber of Nationalities - a representative body designed to accumulate this cultural and political diversity. Endowed with advisory functions, such a chamber would become a platform for developing coordinated approaches on key humanitarian issues. One of the topics that requires discussion in this new constellation is, of course, the goals of sustainable development. While existing discussion formats are too closely related to failures to achieve set goals.

Of course, the path to building such interaction, which in itself creates new prospects for broader humanitarian ties, cannot be simple and problem-free. Moreover, movement towards it may be associated primarily not with contacts between parliamentarians, but with contacts that create conditions for their cooperation.

Thus, at the present stage of development of processes of interaction, cooperation, strategic partnership in Central Eurasia, taking into account the restrictions and threats associated with the broader international context, the creation of a platform for Eurasian dialogue as a supranational parliament may look premature. Incl. due to the fact that the capabilities of the international inter-parliamentary structures existing in Central Eurasia are far from being fully realized and, probably, the gradual use of this potential can be considered as a promising task.

Nevertheless, the limitations manifested in the sphere of existing dialogue formats, affecting its content and effectiveness, can be at the current stage, if not overcome, then partially compensated through such a form as dialogue of experts, expert structures, and expert communities.

This form (beyond the scope of purely technical expertise) turned out to be in demand at the level of the United Nations as an addition to the dialogue of sovereign states. It may be even more useful for associations focused on regional strategic partnerships. The analysis shows that the most promising projects within the framework of expert dialogue have one feature in common: the integration of humanitarian issues into the discussion of socio-economic and political issues.

Promising environments for recruiting potential participants in expert dialogue in the space of Central Eurasia can be considered the spheres of education, science, and culture. Those areas that are perceived as a reflection and repository of national heritage, national experience and at the same time oriented towards dialogue with the outside world and the transfer of experience to new generations. It is an open question to what extent at this stage there are opportunities and readiness for the broad inclusion of youth in such an expert dialogue, but it seems unconditional that the youth component of the dialogue should be present in it.

It is impossible not to take into account that international political and economic reality is perceived not only rationally, but also emotionally: and emotional perception at a given specific moment may turn out to be more important than rational arguments and calculations. This is also the goal of political and propaganda projects of external actors aimed at undermining integration projects and strategic partnership projects in Central Eurasia. And in this regard, joint youth projects and initiatives of the countries of Central Eurasia cannot but be considered as an element of strengthening guarantees of both strategic partnership and sovereign future.

The achieved level of development of economic cooperation in the space of Central Eurasia increases the objective demand for the development of cultural and humanitarian cooperation. And at the same time, cultural and humanitarian cooperation gradually creates and strengthens the common platform that makes it possible to implement large-scale and complex new economic projects, projects of a breakthrough nature.

Objectively, cooperation between the countries of Central Eurasia has the prerequisites to become a “polycentric model”, in which opportunities for development are protected not only for the largest and/or initial project participants, as is the case in the EU, but also for all project participants. This role requires increased attention to the humanitarian component. The basis for this should be the same principles that are laid down in the common historical experience of the states of Central Eurasia and in the tasks of ensuring security and socio-economic cooperation. It is the implementation of these principles that can determine the future of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and the nature of those interstate relations that will form its basis.

Chapter 4. Formation of institutions of solidarity development in Central Eurasia. Principles and directions of development of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

1. Solidarity development as a new approach to understanding modern integration processes

Solidarity development is a paradigm based on the idea that sustainable and inclusive development is possible only through cooperation, mutual assistance and taking into account the interests of all participants in the process. The paradigm is based on the political theory of solidarism (French solidarisme, from solidaire - “acting together”), which assumes solidarity and the desire for compromise, social cooperation and spiritual trust among various layers of society, including classes, parties and interest groups. Solidarity relations are built either on a system of mutually beneficial agreements focused on common interests, or on a set of voluntary communities. Solidarity development models are an alternative to models based on dominance, competition and hierarchy.

The key principles of solidarity development within the framework of the corresponding concept traditionally include:

• Reciprocity and shared benefit for all participants (rejection of “win-lose” logic in favor of “win-win” logic; decisions should benefit all participants in the integration, not just the strongest).

• Taking into account the asymmetry in the level and intensity of economic development (recognition that integration participants are at different levels of development, solidarity is manifested in the creation of mechanisms to promote development, allocation of targeted financial grants, provision of preferential loans, technical assistance, investments in infrastructure, technology transfer).

• Social and environmental responsibility (the success of integration strategies is assessed not only by GDP growth, but also by reducing inequality, protecting workers' rights, compliance with environmental standards, etc.).

• Cultural pluralism and dialogue (avoiding policies of assimilation or domination by one culture, promoting mutual respect, exchange and preservation of identity).

• Collective security and sustainability (jointly confronting challenges and threats, be they military-political and economic crises, pandemics, climate change or hybrid threats).

Solidarity relations are carried out in close connection with the transition to sustainable development, in other words, in them solidarity leads to sustainability, and measures for the transition to sustainable development contribute to the formation and development of solidarity relations. Solidarity relations characterize the value, criterion basis, meaning and content of people’s social activities, and the concept of sustainable development – ​​the means, mechanisms and ways of carrying out this very activity. In this sense, these phenomena strive to ensure harmony and meaningfulness of social life.

A key feature of the transition to solidarity relations and sustainable development is the implementation of the appropriate nature of the transition: not conflict-revolutionary, but solidarity-evolutionary. Unlike previous forms of change of social systems, which were mainly revolutionary and destructive in nature, the transition to a solidarity system, in view of its implementation on the principles of consensus, agreement, tolerance, cooperation, unity, mutual assistance and consolidation, cannot be other than through the use of gradual evolutionary methods of transition with society’s awareness of the need to comply with the above principles of solidary relations.

Modern models of solidarity development are formed mainly as a response to the crisis of two key models of world development:

- imperial model (its elements in the modern EU, in relations between the collective West and the countries of the Global South). This model presupposes relations of dominance and, accordingly, subordination, which provokes disproportions in development, political and socio-economic crises, crises of sovereignty, which in the long term makes this model unstable. Within the imperial model, integration is often accompanied by a policy of colonization and is carried out with the aim of strengthening the metropolis.

- neoliberal model (early EU and principles of the Washington Consensus). Economic liberalization presupposed the implementation of the concept of free trade (free movement of goods, capital, services, etc.). The key disadvantage of this model is the increasing inequality between the “center” and the “periphery”. Thus, the eurozone crisis of 2008-2015 clearly showed how strict economic discipline can lead to social upheaval in less developed countries (Greece, Spain).

The concept of solidarity development in modern integration processes is reflected in the formulation of the corresponding principles of existing associations, as well as in the creation of new structures and formats. The appeal to the idea of ​​solidarity development can be seen in a number of examples:

1. The European Union, having gone through a series of crises, is actively trying to introduce the principles of solidarity. Discussions around the principle of solidarity in the European Union heated up in 2008-2009, as more member states experienced the impact of the global economic crisis. Since then, financial solidarity mechanisms have been developed within the framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was created in 2002 to help EU member states in the event of large-scale disasters. Even earlier, in 1994, the Cohesion Fund was created - a structural fund that helps EU member states reduce economic and social imbalances and stabilize their economies. The Cohesion Fund was originally created as a compensation mechanism for EU Member States with comparatively low income levels in connection with the creation of the European Monetary Union, as provided for by the Maastricht Treaty (1992). In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the NextGenerationEU program was launched. In the same row is the so-called Green Deal (European Green Deal), which grew out of the realization that the ecological transition is impossible without the support of regions dependent on fossil fuels. There are other initiatives within the EU; in general, the debate about “cohesion policy” continues both in practical and political terms, as well as in philosophical and value aspects.

However, despite all its efforts, the EU has not been able to switch to the principles of solidarity development, and its problems clearly demonstrate their absence. Initially, the EU followed the path of unification: a policy of multiculturalism, the construction of a pan-European identity, with the inevitable erasure of national characteristics, borders, economies, etc., with the transfer of part of the sovereignty to the “European bureaucracy”. A number of decisions, especially after the enlargement of the EU, led to the fact that they began to contradict the national interests of the state newly entering the union, and in some cases even the “founding countries”. Examples of this include, in particular, Brexit in the UK and the growth of national sentiment in Germany. Over time, the creation of a single economic space, equalization of living standards, etc. have led to the fact that the benefits of integration within the EU have reached a certain limit. The initially adopted neoliberal model of integration into the EU began to gravitate towards neo-imperial in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe that joined the EU, as well as to third countries. At the same time, the dependence of EU countries as a whole on the United States has increased significantly.

2. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In official documents, the EAEU often appeals to solidarity, pursuing the goal of creating a common market with the free movement of goods, capital, services and labor.

Despite the fact that the integration institutions of the EAEU were built by analogy with the EU, which gravitates towards a closed type of integration, integration processes in the EAEU space as a whole are developing according to an open type, more typical of eastern economies, which retains the opportunity to build interaction, including in the trade and economic sphere, with other world economic centers. As can be seen from the indicators of economic development in 2022-2025, the economy of the EAEU countries, such as Armenia and Kazakhstan, did not shrink due to sanctions pressure on Russia, the closest and largest integration partner, but, on the contrary, grew thanks to the use of country advantages as an “economic bridge.” Thus, the participation of countries in integration processes in the CEA space did not become an obstacle to the economic growth of these countries due to the severe sanctions pressure on Russia, even despite the initial asymmetry.

3. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of the projects to implement the idea of a “community with a common destiny for mankind,” which echoes the ideas of solidarity. As part of this project, large-scale investments are being made in the infrastructure of developing countries. Despite all the stated focus on building a common future for humanity, the project remains exclusive and, in most cases, does not provide mutual benefits from its implementation.

4. New formats: BRICS+, RIC, etc. The expansion of BRICS through new members (Iran, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt, etc.) can be considered as an attempt to create a platform for solidarity development at the global level, where a trend alternative to the liberal order is clearly evident. These formats correspond to the public demand for the formation of a multipolar world, greater justice in global governance, and mutually beneficial economic cooperation without political conditions. According to experts, the creation of truly working mechanisms of mutual support (for example, in payments in national currencies, technological exchange) will become a powerful example of solidarity development in the global South.

Solidarity development acquires the characteristics of a paradigm that is practically necessary for full-scale implementation. Global problems (climate, pandemics, cyber threats, etc.) cannot be solved alone. Integration liberal models based on coercion or pure market logic have exhausted themselves and are generating crises.

Solidarity development is a new approach that shifts the focus from integration as the unification of markets to integration as the creation of a community of mutual responsibility, mutual assistance, and co-development. This is an evolutionary response to the complexity of the modern world, requiring integration participants not only to open borders for goods, but also to be open to compromise, mutual assistance and joint construction of a common future that is sustainable and fair for all. The success of modern integration projects will increasingly depend on their ability to translate the principles of solidarity development into practice.

2. Principles of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

The Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) is a foreign policy and economic initiative put forward by Russia in 2015. This is an economic and civilizational project that offers mutually beneficial cooperation in Eurasia between countries, existing integration associations, projects and initiatives based on common principles and approaches to the development of cooperation.

The BEP is significantly wider than the space from Lisbon to Vladivostok; it opens up not only along parallels, but also along meridians. However, it is limited by the countries’ acceptance and sharing of the principles of partnership. Thus, although the geographical criterion is significant, it cannot be sufficient, much less the only one, when forming a BEP.

The solidarity-evolutionary nature of the project is ensured by the implementation of “integration of integrations” or a network model of cooperation designed to ensure the establishment of a space of security, cooperation and development in Eurasia.

The principles of the BEP include the following:

1. Openness. The partnership is not directed against anyone and is not a closed club. It is open to all countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), partner countries of the EAEU (for example, China, Vietnam, Iran, Serbia), other regional associations, primarily ASEAN, SCO member states, and any other interested states and organizations.

2. The primacy of international law and respect for national sovereignty. The BEP proclaims a rejection of ultimatums, sanctions pressure and politics from a position of strength. The BEP is based on: respect for the development model and internal affairs of each state, equality of all participants, non-interference in internal affairs, freedom of choice of foreign policy and economic partners.

3. Non-discrimination and consideration of the interests of all parties. When creating new rules and standards, the interests of all participants, large and small, must be taken into account. This principle is intended to distinguish BEP from models where the dominant country or union dictates its terms.

4. Economic solidarity and mutual benefit. Focus on specific economic projects and removal of barriers: harmonization and combination of trade rules between different associations; stimulating investments and joint projects in infrastructure, logistics, energy, digitalization; creation of a “seamless” transport and logistics network in Eurasia through Eurasia.

5. Multidimensionality and cooperation. This is a flexible “umbrella” under which different formats of cooperation can coexist: bilateral agreements (for example, between the EAEU and China), multilateral industry initiatives (for example, in energy or transport), mutually beneficial cooperation of existing organizations (EAEU, SCO, ASEAN) and the possible coupling of their structures, projects, initiatives.

6. Preservation of identity and diversity. Eurasia is a continent where different cultures, religions, ethnic groups and civilizations intersect, and there are countries with different political, economic and social systems. Diversity has enormous growth potential, so the Eurasian space does not need unification, but a respectful attitude towards history, the development path of each country, and the preservation of national identity and culture.

The principles of the Greater Eurasian Partnership are a framework that defines the parameters of a new, more flexible, multipolar model of the world order. It reflects the desire of Russia and its partners to create a space of cooperation in Eurasia, based not on bloc confrontation, but on economic pragmatics, respect for sovereignty and network diplomacy. The BEP concept not only determines the strategic vector for the development of Eurasian integration, its implementation can offer model formats and principles at the global level.

3. Ways to establish institutions of solidarity development: from coordination of interaction to partnership for the implementation of strategic goals

The formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership is structured along the following main directions:

1. The CEA space and the collective formats operating in this space, primarily such as the EAEU and the CSTO, form the natural institutional core of the future Greater Eurasian Partnership. At the same time, the construction of the BEP includes harmonization of interaction and interface with other existing regional initiatives and structures, as well as institutional improvement of the integration space of Central Eurasia.

2. The economic development of the BEP space will be largely determined by the countries of the “triangle” Russia – India – China. Already today, the main trade turnover within the SCO is ensured by this “triangle”, which determines its role as the second supporting structure of the BEP. Let us emphasize that it was these three countries that became the founders of the RIC format, which today, also in the expanded BRICS+ format, ensures the formation of a platform for solidarity development at the global level.

3. The emergence of the BEP as a space of interconnected bilateral and multilateral trade and economic agreements will determine the need to disseminate similar principles and approaches to the development of cooperation with countries that are not members of the BEP, as well as at the global level. Despite the fact that the BEP initiative has a continental focus, its role at the global level is also associated with the transfer of economic activity to the countries of the Pacific region, which determines the need for the creation of new logistics routes and economic corridors.

4. The development of a number of promising and important areas for humanity today is impossible on the old conditions and principles. Solving common problems for humanity, such as ensuring water, energy, digital and food security, developing promising areas and areas of activity, such as space exploration, the Arctic, and exploration of the World Ocean, is impossible without closer scientific and technical cooperation and cooperation. These global tasks determine the need to establish a Greater Eurasian Partnership to implement strategic goals, based not only on economic benefits, but also on the sharing of responsibility by its participants for the future of humanity as a whole. This determines the presence of a value component of such a partnership and the need to form appropriate institutional support.

Partnership for the implementation of strategic goals determines the need to create an institutional environment where partners do not simply cooperate to obtain tactical benefits, but jointly define long-term strategic goals and create mechanisms for achieving them, based on cooperation and mutual assistance. The joint formation of the desired future and the collective overcoming of systemic risks lies at the heart of the activities of the institutions of solidarity created for this purpose.

In general, the path to the establishment of institutions of solidarity development is the path from transactional logic (“you to me, I to you”) to transformational logic (“we are building a common future together”). Coordination, which creates channels of communication, and cooperation, which builds trust in practice, play an important role. A strategic partnership based on solidarity institutionalizes this trust, creating a sustainable architecture for jointly tackling grand challenges that are beyond the reach of any one participant alone.

Thus, solidarity development is the result of a purposeful process of institutional building, leading through the coordination of the actions of participants, carried out on the basis of national interests and the cooperation of their efforts in various areas of cooperation, to the formation and manifestation of political will for the implementation of common strategic goals.

4. Central Eurasia as the most important component of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

Central Eurasia (by which we mean the states that are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Union State) is not just one of the components, but a key, strategic element in the concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP). Its role can be described as “core” or “connecting”. Without the successful integration of this region, the very idea of ​​BEP loses its meaning.

In the space of Central Eurasia, the interests of the largest powers and their integration projects intersect, which determines the special role of the CEA as a political platform for the implementation of models of flexible and network integration, or the “integration of integrations” model:

Russia as the core of the EAEU. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the EAEU, which makes the Union truly “Eurasian”. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are observer countries that could hypothetically become members of the EAEU, thanks to which the union will gain greater access to the South Asian region.

China as the initiator and key actor of the Belt and Road project. All Central Asian countries are China's partners in this project. This is where the integration of the EAEU and the Belt and Road project is possible.

Türkiye and its pan-Turkic project (“Turkic world”). Türkiye is actively developing economic and cultural ties with Turkic-speaking countries in Central Asia, forming another vector of cooperation.

India, Pakistan, Iran. Through Central Asia, pathways are opening up for connecting these large Asian economies to the BEP.

Many key transcontinental routes pass or are planned through Central Eurasia: North-South (Russia's connection with India and the Gulf countries through the Caspian and Central Asia), East-West (China's Belt and Road (BRI) project critically depends on Kazakh, Uzbek and other Central Asian routes (for example, the China-Europe corridor through Kazakhstan), the Middle Corridor through The Caspian Sea (an alternative route that has acquired new relevance in the light of sanctions against Russia). Logistics hubs are gaining increasing geo-economic weight. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively investing in the creation of modern logistics and financial hubs, striving to become not just “transit territories”, but full-fledged distribution and added value centers.

Central Eurasia has huge reserves of natural resources - oil, gas, uranium, rare earth metals, copper, gold, etc. This makes it critically important for the energy security and technological development of all of Eurasia. The region has potential in the production of agricultural products (cotton, wheat, fruits, etc.). There are significant labor resources and a significant capacity of the consumer market (the share of young people is high).

Thus, Central Eurasia is the most important artery of the future Greater Eurasian Partnership. The implementation of the BEP will provide Central Eurasia with investments, infrastructure development and increased geopolitical significance. This makes the region a key beneficiary interested in the implementation of the BEP.

5. Prospects for improving institutions that shape the common strategic future

Most integration processes are based on current economic interests. At the same time, in response to foreign policy dynamics and economic conditions, economic interests cannot remain sufficient to ensure the sustainability of the integration association over time. Thus, at the stage of development of integration, its participants inevitably come to the need to search for new unifying bonds. The integration agenda creates narratives of common challenges and threats, as well as a common identity. As can be seen from historical experience, unfortunately, these narratives can be implemented in primitive forms of designating common enemies, searching for differences between “us” and “them,” which provokes an increase in discrimination and escalation of conflicts both outside and within such associations. The very structure of the integration association is becoming more closed and rigid, the management of which is implemented through the dictates of the unification agenda, often to the detriment of the national interests of its participants.

Integration associations based on a common strategic vision are much more stable over time. Such associations have a more flexible internal structure and do not require rigid unification of its participants. The “firmware” of the association is carried out through a set of principles shared by the participants, the observance of which should ensure the achievement of common strategic goals. Instead of searching for a common identity, a policy is being formed to protect uniqueness and diversity, which is expressed in guarantees of preserving the national identity of each participant. Confronting common challenges and threats does not lead to the formation of tactical alliances and bloc formats, the association demonstrates openness to the outside world, and the economic effect is achieved from the implementation of mutually beneficial projects that are in line with the strategic vision of the association. The principles of formation of such integration associations correspond to the principles of solidarity development.

Creating new and improving existing institutions in CEA that shape a common strategic future is an important task on the path to the implementation of the BEP project. The key goal of such institutions is to contribute to the achievement of strategic integration goals.

Despite the presence of various financial and economic institutions operating in the CEA space, there are not many multilateral institutions whose activities are aimed at promoting integration to form a common strategic future. In terms of helping to ensure financial stability, one can cite as an example the work of the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD). It seems that the expansion of its activities, both in terms of geography (the space of CEA, Greater Eurasia) and the functionality of its work (the creation of the Bureau of Resources for Solidarity Development) may allow pilot testing of the creation and operation of new institutional mechanisms of the BEP.

The activities of the Bureau of Solidarity Development Resources are designed to ensure the development and launch of multilateral mutually beneficial projects in the Eurasian space that are in line with the general strategic vision of the future BEP. The concept of such projects should carry a socially conservative agenda, aimed at improving people’s lives, preserving identity, cultural and natural heritage, ensuring financial stabilization and progressive economic development.

Conclusion

The conclusions that can be drawn within the framework of the report indicate that the processes accompanying the formation of a multipolar world are associated with an expanding range of challenges and threats of a military-political, economic and socio-cultural nature. The goals of ensuring security and development dictate to the countries of Greater Eurasia the importance of improving regional cooperation and creating more effective mechanisms for collectively solving problems in these areas.

Effective cooperation mechanisms have been created in various parts of Greater Eurasia to effectively defend interests. At the same time, in the context of the worsening of old faults and the emergence of new faults on the continent and in the world, it is important for the countries of the region to develop cooperation to more effectively solve existing and newly emerging problems and, without confining themselves to existing formats, to look for new approaches to uniting joint efforts.

Greater Eurasia, being a colossal space, does not have its own coordinating system and structure for ensuring peace and stability. From the point of view of ensuring peace and stability in Greater Eurasia, it would be important to agree on approaches similar to those established by the 1975 Helsinki Agreements. The most suitable document for this could be the Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century, initiated by Belarus and supported by Russia.

One of the objectives of the Eurasian Charter should be the formation of a full-fledged Eurasian Security System (EASS), which should be considered as a complex phenomenon covering various institutions, a wide range of actors, principles and norms, new political and diplomatic practices, including informal ones, initiatives, and ideological meanings. It will probably be an open multi-structural dynamic system - a conglomerate of international structures, states and non-state players, between which there are flexible, often non-linear connections. The outer contours of the system will be characterized as “soft edges”.

In terms of the economy, there is a structural shift from the Western to the Eastern vector of trade. It is expressed in two key trends: increased economic integration with Russia and the growing role of China. The scale of the challenges, a high degree of uncertainty, external economic shocks and the inevitable strengthening of economic ties both within the region and with the largest economies of Eurasia require the creation of an institution that can provide effective support in ensuring economic security as one of the elements of the security system in the region. Such a mechanism should be built on the principles of solidary development shared by the entire region, taking into account and disseminating the best regional and global expertise, providing the ability to manage risks to economic stability and providing an objective assessment of regional initiatives and projects.

From a sociocultural point of view, Central Eurasia has emerged as a space of different cultures that complement each other, which has become a serious advantage. However, it is necessary to institutionalize multilateral dialogue on the platform of a kind of House of Nationalities - a representative body that provides the opportunity for all representatives of all Central Eurasian states to participate in the discussion of current issues.

Thus, the most effective formats for uniting and coordinating joint efforts would be institutions of solidarity development as multinational formats created to solve pressing problems in various fields of activity.

In general, the state of security and level of economic well-being of the states of the continent will largely depend on the ability of the countries of Greater Eurasia to objectively assess global trends, choose optimal development paths and create a viable system of cooperation and resolve controversial issues.

Today there are some signs of readiness of the countries of the region to take concrete steps towards rapprochement and coordination of activities. Nevertheless, the implementation of the described model requires a more active and in-depth discussion, awareness of the fact that sustainable peace and stability are achievable only if the peoples of Greater Eurasia are ready to take full responsibility for the secure future of the region.